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Preface 
This paper is a contribution to IIASA7s research concerning the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED). It explores a question-that of post-negotiation 
implementation of agreements-which is often ignored by negotiation researchers because, tech- 
nically, it lies outside the process. However, given the urgency and severity of many of the 
environmental problems being negotiated at UNCED and on the agenda for future negotia- 
tions, it is extremely important to conduct analyses and make recommendations concerning 
how negotiated agreements are or should be implemented at a global, regional, and local level. 
While there is an emerging literature on regime building and compliance with negotiated 
agreements in the negotiation field, the issue of treaty ratification-a first step in the post- 
negotiation process-has received little attention. This pilot study attempts to shed some light, 
through a systematic analysis of historical environmental treaties, on the difficulties of rati- 
fication and their roots in treaty and issue complexity. Several policy recommendations are 
made, drawing upon the lessons learned from this analysis, to modify current negotiation and 
post-negotiation processes in such a way as to reduce treaty ratification time. 
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Introduction 
One of the chronic problems within the overall negotiation process occurs a#er the 
formal negotiation is concluded, in the post-negotiation period. While agreements may be 
reached successfully in negotiations, implementation of those agreements, especially in the 
international environmental domain, is particularly problematic. First, ratification of the 
agreements by a significant number of countries often can take many years. Second, once 
an agreement is ratified by a nation, its provisions have to be put into effect behaviorally -- 
they have to become the law of the land, enforced, obeyed, and monitored. Because of the 
long time frame for ratification and behavioral implementation, and the time criticality of 
many of the problems addressed by environmental agreements, "successful" negotiated 
outcomes are often viewed as "too little, too late" when they finally take effect. 
Chayes (1991), discussing the current negotiations toward developing a framework 
convention on climate change, indicates that realistically, even if a convention is adopted at 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992, as expected, 
"it will be years, perhaps decades, before agreed limitations on greehouse gas emissions are 
legally in effect" @. 61). The ratification process for the convention would take years to 
complete and then protocols that specify particular emission targets would still have to be 
negotiated. These, too, would certainly take time to ratify and then put into force. The 
international mechanisms required to monitor compliance with the provisions of these 
protocols would also have to be negotiated and implemented, thus adding yet more years 
before a stable global regime to curb greenhouse gases is operational. This slow-paced 
process of international cooperation is juxtaposed in sharp contrast with a scientific problem 
whose consequences may become irreversible by the time agreed upon limits become 
effective. 
While negotiated environmental agreements have perhaps been more prone to this 
problem of lagging implementation, in comparison to negotiated agreements in other issue 
areas, the problem is likely to get worse in the future. The distinctive aspect of UNCED is 
its emphasis on the linkages and interconnectedness between environmental sectors 
(deforestation and climate change, for example) and between environmental issues and other 
issue areas (for example, trade and environment, development and environment, health and 
environment, and financial resources and environment). When the topics under negotiation 
are defined in such multiple issue packages, the result is that the negotiation process becomes 
much more complex and lengthy as does the post-negotiation process of ratification and 
implementation. Solutions must address not one, but many, interacting issues and problems 
-- identifying and resolving tradeoffs across multiple issues -- in order to develop a 
comprehensive packaged agreement . 
While it is often very difficult for negotiators to strike such multiple issue deals at the 
international bargaining table, they can face insurmountable impasses when they return home 
to defend the final text at ratification hearings. Negotiators representing their countries 
before an international forum may be sufficiently flexible to reach an agreement. But 
stakeholders back home (such as ministry bureaucrats, political parties, business, unions, 
citizen lobbies, etc.) may be much more hard-nosed and tough as internal domestic 
negotiators, responsible for approving and implementing the product of international 
negotiation. If these domestic actors were not involved in the prior international negotiation 
phases -- especially in terms of framing the issue and clarifying national interests -- their 
perspectives may not be accounted for in the negotiated settlement itself. 
The new UNCED-inspired approach of defining issues in terms of their linkages is 
certain to result in bundled agreements that extend across various interest domains, and likely 
to make future environmental agreements more complex. Such multi-issue treaties will be 
more prone to deadlock in their implementation than their single issue counterparts. And 
what is the use of carefully negotiating a regional or global pact if the interested parties 
cannot or will not implement the agreed provisions at a national level? 
This post-negotiation implementation process has received little attention by behavioral 
negotiation researchers, despite its obvious importance. Several researchers (Young, 1989; 
Thacher, 1991; Usui, 1991; Haas, 1975) recently have begun to analyze and evaluate the 
governance of negotiated agreements in the post-negotiation period and the establishment and 
operation of regimes that set the rules and procedures by which nations agree to implement, 
abide by, and settle disputes concerning international agreements. Many of these researchers 
have focused particularly on the problems of governing international environmental 
agreements. Other researchers, using a prescriptive approach, suggest that lessons can be 
learned from previous experiences at implementation and propose modifications to the 
process and structure of post-negotiation implementation (Sand, 1991; Salzburg Seminar, 
1990). 
Yet, basic research on the problems of the post-negotiation phase is seriously lacking. 
Little can be found on problems of treaty ratification, for example, the first serious stage in 
the post-negotiation cycle. It is important to understand: 
o The characteristics of negotiated agreements that may give rise to post- 
negotiation implementation problems. 
o The characteristics of the negotiation process itself that may result in 
implementation problems after negotiations are concluded. 
o The problems in the ratification and implementation processes that could be 
averted or moderated if the negotiated agreements were formulated differently 
or the negotiation process conducted differently. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a systematic empirical analysis across a 
sample of internationally negotiated environmental agreements that will begin to diagnose 
post-negotiation implementation problems. By understanding the problems incurred in 
implementing these negotiation outcomes, appropriate approaches to modifying the process 
and structure of implementation hopefully can be developed. 
UNCED -- Issue Linkages and Increasing Complexity 
As indicated earlier, UNCED has institutionalized a new approach to environmental 
negotiations in which multi-issue linkages are the vehicles by which the substantive problems 
are framed in the negotiation. Many physical linkages between key issues can be 
substantiated by the scientific community. However, attempts to use these linkages to resolve 
problems or disputes in past negotiations have often failed because of an inability to 
disentangle and assess tradeoffs in complex multi-issue environments. Certainly, there first 
must be a detailed understanding of the linkages themselves. Systems analysis, for example, 
can serve a useful educational purpose here. This approach offers an appropriate logic and 
methodology to develop not only a comprehensive understanding of the issue linkages 
themselves, but a range of alternative approaches that can resolve the problem or dispute 
implied in the linkages (Shaw, et al. 1991). 
But the political reality of negotiation must also be accounted for. Within the 
negotiation process itself, the growth in issue complexity is likely to increase the difficulty 
of striking a deal, finding a tradeoff that is agreeable to all parties. This has been 
demonstrated in the prenegotiation phase leading up to the UNCED Conference. Not only 
has it been difficult to define the issues and multi-issue linkages in a way that is mutually 
acceptable to all actors; the negotiations are threatened with deadlock because of strong 
emotional ties to central national interests and positions -- the demand for new and additional 
financial support from developing countries and the demand to respect intellectual property 
rights from industrialized nations, for instance. 
Beyond the negotiation -- in the post-negotiation period -- implementation is also 
likely to be hampered by issue complexity. Domestic negotiations are required to ratify and 
execute the actions implied by the negotiated agreement. Domestic stakeholders, strongly 
attached to different issues contained in the agreement package and pulling in different 
directions, can cause such negotiations over implementation to grind to a halt. If the 
problems of treaty implementation described by Chayes earlier are true, the trend toward 
even more complex negotiated agreements in the future is likely to exacerbate the dilemma. 
In the negotiation literature, Fisher (1969) addresses the problem of negotiating 
complex multi-issue packages. One of the most effective approaches, for which many 
successful illustrations can be found, is tofractionate the issues being debated. Using this 
approach, the conflict is dissected into manageable, independent elements, each to be settled 
separately. Easier issues can be resolved earlier, thereby developing a sense of trust and 
momentum for resolution that can support mechanisms for agreement on the more difficult 
issues. What this tactic does is not only disentangle the issues that are linked; it also 
eliminates the subissues that are represented by the linkages themselves -- the relationships 
between issues. 
A corollary to this fractionation principle for the post-negotiation period would 
involve breaking the agreement into manageable pieces, thus separating conflicting interests 
and facilitating the ability to find common ground by making the joint problem-solving task 
simpler. However, the corollary becomes largely invalid due to the fact that the first stage 
of post-negotiation implementation -- treaty ratification -- is usually viewed as an all-or- 
nothing exercise. While exceptions can be taken to certain provisions of a treaty in the 
ratification process, carefully balanced negotiated agreements can easily become inoperable, 
and mistrust between negotiating parties increase, if the treaty is not accepted in its entirety. 
Political tradeoffs based on scientifically substantiated linkages cannot be easily decoupled. 
Thus, fractionation in the ratification process is not an option. 
What then are the implications for implementation, given this growing trend toward 
increased issue complexity in environmental negotiations? The more complex and multi- 
sectoral the treaty, the more difficult it will be to satisfy the multiple interests of domestic 
stakeholders who must ratify it at a national level. As a result, even if international 
negotiations are capable of yielding these complex multi-issue formulations, implementation 
is going to produce even greater and more difficult problems. While science and logic 
suggest that these troublesome issues be considered and resolved in a linked fashion, based 
upon the UNCED model, the political reality of ratifying and implementing such complex 
agreements may yield deadlock. 
There seems to be a need to devise either a new approach to treaty formulation -- how 
the negotiation process generates formulas that all parties can agree to -- or a new approach 
to the post-negotiation process of ratification and implementation. For the former, the need 
would be to develop ways in which formulas dealing with complex linkages among many 
issues can be made simpler or detachable into its component pieces. For the latter, improved 
decision making or problem solving mechanisms would have to be designed that would 
increase the capacity of multiple stakeholders within national actors to confront complex 
multi-issue treaties, view their interests within the context of the treaties, and reach consensus 
domestically on ratification and implementation approaches. 
Method 
The objective of the analysis is to test the hypothesis that issue complexity in the 
negotiated agreement increases post-negotiation implementation problems, in particular, in 
the ratzjication process. The results of a pilot study are reported here. The analysis takes 
a cross-sectional form across a sample of negotiated environmental agreements, in which the 
variables of issue complexity and ratification difficulties are operationalized and measured. 
The United Nations Environment Programme's latest Register of Zntemational Treaties 
and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment (1991) was used as a guide to identify 
a sample of international, multilateral agreements on environmental issues. The register has 
a comprehensive listing of such agreements. In total, 152 agreements dating from 1921 to 
1989 are listed and summarized in the register. Of these, 33 agreements met the following 
criteria: 
o The agreement is concerned with international environmental issues, not 
regional issues 
o Membership in the agreement is not restricted to certain countries or 
geographic regions 
o The agreement must already be entered into force. 
The resulting sample includes agreements that went into force between 1923 and 1983. 
Several variables were measured for each agreement. First, the dependent variable - 
- rat@cation dzflculty -- was operationalized as the average time to ratzfi the agreement. 
This variable was measured for each treaty by calculating the number of years between each 
country's ratification and the agreement's entry into force, and then averaging the difference 
over the number of countries that have ratified. This data was provided in the Register. The 
variable answers the question: of all the countries who have ratified the agreement, how long 
did it take them, on average, to overcome the domestic problem of ratification. The longer 
the time to ratify, the more difficulty is assumed. 
The independent variable -- issue complexity -- was operationalized to tap whether the 
agreement concerned a single issue or multiple issues. To measure this variable it was 
necessary to refer to the complete text of each agreement in the sample and code the 
principal issues dealt with. The agreement texts are available in two UNEP compendiums 
edited by Kiss (1983) and Rummel-Bulska and Osafo (1991). 
Results 
Is rat@cation really a problem ? 
The average length of time to ratify over all the agreements in the sample is 5.8 years. The 
shortest times recorded to ratify were .l to .5 years, while the longest were 22.8 and 23.1 
years. But these are the extremes; half of the treaties hovered around the mean, with 
ratification times of 3 to 8 years. 
Is the problem getting worse over time? 
Figure 1 suggests clearly that historically the average time to ratify environmental agreements 
is decreasing, not increasing. 
Average Time t o  R a t i f y  ( i n  y e a r s )  
1920-409 19502 1960s 19709 1980s 
Years 
n-33 
Figure 1. Average T i e  to Ratify Environmental Agreements over Seven Decades 
What issues are addressed by the treaties and how are they related to 
rat@cation time ? 
The 33 agreements can be grouped into seven issue categories. There appear to be 
significant distinctions in terms of length of time to ratify between these categories. 
Categow of Agreement 
Average Number Single/ 
of Years to Ratify Multi-Issue 
Liability for environmental accidents (n =4) 2.8 Single 
Disarmament and pollution control(n =5) 3.0 Multiple 
Conservation(n = 5) 4.7 Single 
Commercial exploitation of resources(n = 3) 5.0 Single 
Pollution prevention or control(n = 6) 6.0 Single 
Worker health and pollution control(n = 6) 8.1 Multiple 
Conservation and regulations on industry(n =4) 10.1 Multiple 
Three categories of agreements -- pollution prevention or control, worker health and pollution 
control, and conservation and regulations on industry -- take longer than average to ratify, 
from 6.0 to 10.1 years. Interestingly, the latter two treaty categories contain multi-issue 
treaties, agreements where the issue content is more complex due to concern for linkages 
between two or more key issues. 
Is time to ratiJL a Jirnction of the issue complexity of an agreement? 
There are 19 single issue treaties and 14 multi-issue treaties in the sample. The difference 
in the time required to ratify between these two categories of issue complexity appears to be 
significant. 
Issue Complexity 
Average Number of 
Years to Ratify 
Single issue treaties 4.75 
Multi-issue treaties 7.2 
Conclusions 
This pilot study examines just a few variables, very simply, to assess a very 
complicated post-negotiation process. However, the results are revealing. Environmental 
treaties do indeed require a long time frame for ratification, a period before implementation 
of the provisions can even be considered. As Chayes (1991) and others have indicated, the 
scientific characteristics of environmental issues, global warming in particular, are such that 
the consequences of waiting for such a period of time can be disastrous and the damage 
incurred irreversible. 
Encouragingly, our historical sample of international environmental treaties suggests 
a trend toward shorter average times to ratify. Over the past seven decades covered in the 
sample, ratification periods have declined dramatically. This phenomenon might be 
attributable to improved communications among countries, the establishment of international 
organizations, and the growing list of legal precedent, which all serve to educate nations of 
the urgency of implementing negotiated agreements so as to begin containment or 
conservation actions. However, during the 1980s, the waiting period for ratification still 
averaged close to 3 years. 
The types of environmental agreements that produce the most ratification difficulty 
are multi-issue treaties dealing with preventing or controlling pollution, worker health, and 
industry regulation. These three categories, in particular, involve restriction or limitation on 
current industrial activity in order to be compliant. Perhaps such restrictive provisions, 
aimed at largely economic interests, alert and activate influential business stakeholders and 
lobbyists at a domestic level, thereby prolonging the domestic debate concerning ratification 
and bringing it to near-stalemate. 
Ultimately, the strong difference in the average time to ratify between single and 
multi-issue treaties indicates that issue complexity is a major contributing factor to delay and 
possible rejection of internationally negotiated agreements that need to be implemented at a 
national level. 
Given the precedent and logic of UNCED -- the negotiation and tradeoff of complex 
linked issues -- are future environmental negotiations threatened by innefective and lengthy 
post-negotiation ratification processes? At least two implications can be drawn from our 
results. First, the negotiation process in which these complex multi-issue formu.las are 
developed may need to be modified. The process must certainly acknowledge the scientific 
and logical evidence concerning linkages among many environmental and other issues; the 
complexity of the problem cannot be denied. However, the actors who are the source of 
ratification difficulties can be made to better understand the complexity. The various 
domestic stakeholders need to be provided with a sense of ownership over the internationally 
negotiated treaties. This can be accomplished by including key interest groups on national 
delegations to the negotiations. By taking part in the debates and the formulation of the 
agreements, their concerns can be aired before the agreement is generated and they will be 
able to bring back to their national constituency the rationale for certain provisions that 
otherwise might be hard for them to swallow. Several nations attending the UNCED 
Preparatory Committee meetings have already included business, interest, and citizen groups 
as official members of their delegations. Moreover, the participation of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) at these UNCED meetings is unprecedented in terms of numbers. 
Second, perhaps a new approach to the post-negotiation process is required to reduce 
the problem of ratification delay and stalemate. Here again, a form of education at the 
national level may be the key (Sjostedt and Spector, 1992). NGOs and the media can play 
a useful role in educating national political actors about the environmental and linked issues, 
so that they will understand the rationale for the linkages and the solutions. Too, greater 
involvement from the scientific community -- publicizing the dangers of not acting and 
presenting the benefits for creative tradeoffs of linking issues -- could serve to hasten 
ratification at the national level. 
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